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The recent literature  on transition  economies  provides  a multitude  of stylized facts  on enterprise
restructuring. A number  of studies  have established  partial correlations  between  firm restructuring  in
Central and Eastern European  countries (CEECs)  and firm-specific  variables relating  to initial
conditions,  hardening  of budget  constraints,  and internal  governance.  Most regression-based  analyses
have tended to be based on industry-level  data. A few use small cross-sections  of firms. Almost  all
studies focus on the advanced  transition  economies  (Czech  Republic, Hungary, Poland). This paper
extends  the literature  on the microeconomics  of transition  by investigating  the relative  importance  of
integration  into world markets as a source of productivity  growth at the level of the firm in Bulgaria.
The empirical  analysis  is motivated  by the general body of conceptual  work relating  to the role
of international  trade as a source of growth. The primary focus is on the potential  importance  for
economic  growth of greater access  to global markets for designs, equipment  and intermediates
following  trade liberalization.  From the perspective  of an individual  firm the intensity  of competition  in
the final product market should  be a powerful force inducing  efforts to restructure  and improve
productive  efficiency.  Empirically,  however, it is difficult  to incorporate  this factor into a firm-level
econometric  analysis  since import competition  is common  to all firms in an industry. A trade-related
factor that can be taken into account in a firm-level  analysis  is the role of access  to foreign
intermediates  and capital goods, as well as the greater access  to world markets for the firm's output  that
emerged as a result  of the abolition  of central planning. To a significant  extent the policy  shift involved
is analogous  to a move from autarky (the CMEA system)  to virtual free trade.  As a result,  the forces
identified  in the endogenous  growth literature should  operate, i.e., firms now have the opportunity  to
buy intermediates  and equipment  that allows them to improve  their productivity  and to learn-by-
exporting  to more mature markets. The changes  that occurred in trade patterns subsequent  to opening
the economy  provide one indicator  of attempts  by managers  to import  better technology.
The results of the empirical  analysis  suggest  that trade is an important  source of TFP growth at
the level of the firm.  As is suggested  by the endogenous  growth literature, trade matters. We find that
shifts in the pattern of imports  of intermediates--and  reorientation  of export production--towards  global
markets  are positively  correlated  with TFP growth. The coefficients  are of the expected  sign, relatively
large in magnitude,  and statistically  highly significant. In contrast, the level of exports as a share of
output  was found not be correlated  with TFP growth. Although  no attempt  has been made to establish
causality,  the partial correlations  that are found are highly suggestive. They support  the theory in the
sense that firms that reorient their trade patterns--which  is argued to be the most appropriate  measure  of
trade integration  for economies  in transition--tend  to have higher  growth rates of total factor
productivity.Trade Reorientation  and Post-Reform  Productivity  Growth
in Bulgarian  Enterprises
I.  Introduction
There are a growing  number  of studies  establishing  partial correlations  between firm restructuring  in
Central and Eastern European  countries  (CEECs)  and firm-specific  variables relating  to initial
conditions,  hardening  of budget constraints,  and internal  governance. This paper extends  the literature
on the microeconomics  of transition  by investigating  the relative importance  of  integration  into world
arkets as a source of productivity  growth at the level of the firm. The empirical analysis  is motivated
by the general  body of conceptual  work relating  to the role of international  trade as a source of growth.
The primary focus is on the potential  importance  for economic  growth of greater access  to global
markets  for designs, equipment  and intermediates  following  trade liberalization  (Romer, 1991;
Grossman  and Helpman, 1991; Feenstra, Markusen,  and Zeile, 1992). Our results suggest  that firm-
level total factor productivity  growth in Bulgaria  in the initial  post-reform  period (1991-95)  exhibits
systematic  variations  with the degree of integration  in world trade.
The paper is organized  as follows: Section  II surveys  the existing  literature on enterprise
restructuring  in economies  in transition. Much of the analysis  in the literature has been at the level of
the economy  as a whole, or at the level of the industry. As relatively little work has been done at the
level of the firm, we develop  a simple  conceptual  framework  that is helpful in understanding  the
approach  that is pursued. Section  III briefly discusses  the process of economic  reform in Bulgaria  after
1991. Section  IV describes  the data set and Section  V sets out the estimation  procedure that is used to
relate firm-level  productivity  growth  to various explanatory  variables, including  changes  in integration
into the world market. Section  VI reports the results. Changes in the pattern of imports  of
intermediates  and sales for export are found  to be significant,  both in absolute  terms and statistically.
Section  VII concludes.II.  Survey  of the Literature  and Conceptual  Framework
The recent literature on transition  economies  provides a multitude  of stylized  facts on enterprise
restructuring. A large number  of case studies  describe the restructuring  process in great detail. Most
regression-based  analyses  tend to be based on industry-level  data.  A few use small cross-sections  of
firms (e.g., Pinto and van Wijnbergen, 1994). Almost  all studies focus on the advanced  transition
economies  (Czech Republic,  Hungary, Poland). Definitions  of restructuring  vary, and are often not
stated  explicitly. Three types of restructuring  can be identified,  all of which are interrelated:
operational  restructuring  (e.g. changing  the factor mix through layoffs), financial  restructuring  (e.g.,
rescheduling  or forgiveness  of debt), and legal restructuring  (e.g., transformation  of state-owned
enterprises  (SOEs) into  joint stock companies;  or privatization). Profitability  is often used as a proxy
for restructuring:  a firm that attains or maintains  profitability  is implied  to have taken the necessary
steps to restructure. In the transition  context, however, the link between  restructuring  and profitability
is loose.  Firms will be subject  to various shocks  and often  will not have incentives  to report profits
truthfully. In many countries  profit shifting  and tax evasion  are pervasive, and it is often difficult  to
assess  the initial conditions  that apply on a firm-by-firm  basis (because  of the accounting  conventions
used under central  planning). Measuring  restructuring  on the basis of levels or changes  in firm
productivity  avoids some of these problems. Thus, many studies  use labor productivity  (Svejnar,
1996). Although  the literature on developing  countries  has focused on changes  in total factor
productivity  (TFP), due to data non-availability  this has not yet been done in the context of economies
of transition. Conceptually,  the latter measure is the most relevant  measure  to capture efforts to
restructure  at the level of the firm. As the data set available  to us is detailed enough  to allow for TFP
estimation,  this is the variable  used in this paper.





Figure 1: Measuring  Restructuring  at the Firm Level
A useful conceptual framework for thinking  about  various measures  of restructuring  at the level
of the firm is illustrated  in Figure 1. Suppose  a firm is initially at point A on the production  frontier
under central  planning (PPFCp).  After the collapse of central  planning  and the implementation  of
economic  reform, the firm confronts  major shocks  as aggregate  demand  collapses,  relative prices of
goods and services  change drastically,  etc.'  As a result, subject  to varying  lags depending  on access  to
finance,  feasibility  of building up inter-enterprise  arrears and the like, the managers  of the firm will
adjust input  use and reduce output. This process  may involve  large-scale  layoffs. It may also involve
the firm moving  inside  the PPF (say to point C) as a result  of constraints  on adjusting  factor use, or
because  of deliberate  actions by managers  to strip the firm of valuable  resources for private gain.
Associated  reductions  in input use are not in themselves  indicative  of restructuring;  they are largely
driven  by the macro shock.
Under central  planning the firm is expected  to be inefficient  relative  to a cost-minimizing  firm
that uses global "best practice" technologies. In Figure 1, the distance  between  points A and F is a
' See  World  Bank  (1996)  for a description  and  analysis  of the  stylized  facts  of the  initial  stages  of transition
away  from  central  planning.
3measure of the productivity  growth potential. The movement  towards  the best practice  production
possibility  frontier (PPFE)  that should  occur over time as firms adjust to the post-reform  set of
incentives  captures efforts by management  to restructure. This may involve  downsizing  (e.g., towards
point E) or expansion  (say to point D).  Thus, there are two dimensions  to the adjustment  process that
must be kept distinct:  the resource  reallocation  effects  of demand and associated  systemic  shocks; and
the productivity  growth effect that arises from management  efforts to improve  efficiency.
Empirical studies  of the behavior  of firms in transition  economies  have identified  three broad
determinants  of restructuring:  a firm's initial  conditions  ("inheritance"),  corporate governance  (internal
disciplines),  and market disciplines  (including  both import competition  and hardening  of budget
constraints). Initial  conditions  include factors  such as sector of activity (Estrin, Gelb, and Singh,
1995), prior efforts at transformation  (Estrin and Takla, 1995), the magnitude  and quality of the
existing  capital stock, and the firm's financial  situation  (liabilities;  creditworthiness;  access  to
established  channels  of financing). Corporate governance  includes  the structure  of property rights,
especially  the extent of progress towards  full privatization  (Estrin, 1994),  the bargaining  power of labor
unions (Aghion,  Blanchard  and Burgess, 1994),  and the presence of outside  owners (Blanchard  and
Keeling, 1996). Although  market disciplines  are largely external to the firm, much may depend  on
managerial  expectations  regarding  how binding  these disciplines  are.  Thus, a belief that governments
will not bail out loss-making  firms or entities  that have built up large inter-enterprise  arrears and
accounts  payable is important  (Kotzeva  and Perotti, 1996).
The better are a firm's initial conditions  in comparison  to other firms in an industry,  the greater
the probability  that the firm will survive the transition  to a market economy. If initial conditions  are
"too" bad, the firm will  presumably  be broken up and liquidated  at some point, depending  among other
things on the hardness  of budget constraints. From an efficiency  perspective,  the better the initial
conditions,  the less scope there may be for productivity  improvements. In terms of Figure 1, the closer
4PPFCp  is to PPFE, the smaller the scope (need) for restructuring.  In most cases even if initial conditions
are relatively good, virtually no firms confronted hard budget constraints and market disciplines under
central planning.  As a result, the conventional wisdom is that firms were generally far from best
practices.  The existence of certain initial conditions may then facilitate adjustment--e.g.,  the better the
access to finance and the lower the inherited debt burden, the greater the scope for restructuring.  The
general presumption in the literature is that the greater the extent to which a firm can continue to
benefit from subsidies and build-up arrears,  the less incentive managers have to restructure.
Conversely, the imposition of hard budget constraints should induce (with some lag) productivity
improvements or lead to exit (Claessens and Peters,  1996).  Finally, the standard hypothesis in the
literature is that the greater the extent of private ownership, the better the productivity growth
performance of the firm should be (Estrin and Takla,  1995).
From the perspective of an individual firm the intensity of competition in the final product
market should be a powerful force inducing efforts to restructure and improve productive efficiency.
Empirically, however, it is difficult to incorporate this factor into a firm-level econometric analysis
since import competition is common to all firms in an industry.  Studies investigating the impact of
import competition in final product markets therefore focus on industries as the unit of analysis.  This
issue is not the focus of analysis in this paper.2 Given that our interest is in productivity performance at
the level of the firm, this effect is subsumed in industry dummies (see below).
Another trade-related factor that can be taken into account in a firm-level analysis is the role of
access to foreign intermediates and capital goods,  as well as the greater access to world markets for the
firm's  output that emerged as a result of the abolition of central planning.  To a significant extent the
policy shift involved is analogous to a move from autarky (the CMEA system) to virtual free trade.  As
2 Using an approach  that is similar  to the studies  by Levinsohn  (1993)  and Harrison  (1994), Djankov  and
Hoekman  (1996)  investigate  the role of import competition  in final goods  markets  on Bulgarian  industries  and
conclude  that  this is an important  determinant  of differences  in industry  performance.
5a result, the forces identified in the endogenous growth literature should operate, i.e.,  firms now have
the opportunity to buy intermediates and equipment that allows them to improve their productivity (see
Romer,  1991; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Feenstra,  Markusen, Zeile,  1992), and to learn-by-
exporting to more mature markets (Clerides, Lach, and Tybout,  1996).  The importance of these
factors in "explaining" productivity growth has to our knowledge not been investigated in the transition
literature.3 Under central planning Bulgarian firms depended on the former CMEA markets for both
inputs and exports.  The changes that occurred in trade patterns subsequent to opening the economy
provide one indicator of attempts by managers to import better technology.  On the export side, buyers
may transmit knowledge and designs that they receive from their other (often OECD) suppliers (World
Bank,  1993).  Our results suggest that greater imports of inputs and expanding exports to OECD
markets are strongly correlated with increases in total factor productivity.'
111.  Economic Reforms in Bulgaria
Before turning to the empirical analysis it is helpful to briefly summarize economic developments in
Bulgaria during 1991-95.  Starting in February  1991, Bulgaria underwent a "big bang"  stabilization and
structural reform program.5 Most prices were liberalized, subsidies to most enterprises cut, and tight
3 It is of course difficult  to determine  the direction  of causality  and we make  no attempt  to solve the problem
of the endogeneity  of firm-level  productivity  growth  and the extent  of participation  in international  trade (Tybout
and Westbrook,  1995;  Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1996).
'  Three firm-level  studies  that  have attempted  to determine  the impact  of exports on firm performance  all
concluded  that this was not significant. Estrin and Takla (1995)  found  that the pre-reform  export share of sales
had no explanatory  power when  regressed  on changes  in labor  productivity. Using  the same  data set on Bulgarian
firms, Peters and Claessens  (1996)  and Avramov  and Guenov  (1995)  find no correlation  between  the share of
current exports in production  and changes  in value added and profitability,  respectively. One reason  for this is
arguably  mis-specification:  there is no reason  why the level of exports should  be correlated  with the change in a
measure  of efficiency. More likely is that changes  in productivity  are associated  with changes  (i.e., increases)  in
the level and direction  of exports (see Tybout  and Roberts, 1995).
5 See Bogetic  and Hillman  (1995)  for comprehensive  discussions  of the Bulgarian  economy  in transition.
6monetary, fiscal and incomes policies adopted.  Imports were substantially liberalized: exchange
controls, quantitative restrictions and licensing requirements were abolished.  A five-band tariff system
was put in place,  with tariffs equaling 5,  10,15, 25, or 40 percent (Fane,  1995).6  Export restrictions,
initially maintained for agriculture and reflecting food shortages in the country, were mostly abolished
by  1993.  State enterprise managers were given autonomy in decision-making.  However, centralized
wage setting through union-government bargaining and high excess wages tax reduced the scope for
SOEs to link wages to productivity and sales.
Two distinctive factors characterize Bulgaria in the early transition period.  First, privatization
was not pursued with any vigor.  Only about 10 percent of some 3,800 SOEs were privatized between
1992-95, accounting for just 2.5 percent of total assets (Claessens and Peters,  1996).  The continued
existence of a large state sector delayed the creation of new private industrial firms.  Most new firms
focused on the provision of services--both at the retail level (e.g., distribution, restaurants) and business
services (e.g.,  transport,  intermediation).  The lack of privatization of industrial firms,  in conjunction
with a variety of tax-related incentives led to widespread "joint ventures" between private sector firms
and industrial SOEs.  As discussed at length in Hillman et al. (1995), private enterpreneurs  had an
incentive to use the assets of SOEs rather than establish separate production facilities, which were
difficult to establish in any event given the uncertain policy environment regarding both property rights
and macro-economic developments.  SOE managers benefitted from such arrangements through greater
opportunities for personal enrichment. The State lost, as the tax base was eroded.
A second factor is subsidies to large enterprises.  Kotzeva and Perotti (1996) report that 70% of
firm managers in 1994 expected a government bailout in case of poor performance.  Soft loans
extended to loss-making enterprises undermined the capital base of the banking system and reduced
6 The average  collected  tariff (tariff revenues  as a share of imports)  was 7 percent in 1993-94.
7access to credit for other firms.  Although the Government wrote off a significant portion of enterprise
debt in 1991 and again in 1993 (in large part by converting bad  "loans" into government bonds),
aggregate subsidies (budget transfers and soft bank loans) to the industrial sector declined from 16% of
GDP in 1990 to 2% of GDP in 1995.  As noted by Claessens and Peters (1996), the hard-core of large
loss-makers that continued to be financed through loans from state-owned banks, budget transfers, and
arrears  (tax, wage, and inter-enterprise) were concentrated in the utilities, mining, and construction
sectors.  Industrial firms generally confronted hard budget constraints early in the transition.7
Both factors should have negative implications for measures of productivity growth.  In the first
case this is because of standard "governance" related reasons,  complemented by the fact that there will
be an incentive for SOEs to try to underreport profits.  If subsidies remain in place,  restructuring
incentives decline.  However, as mentioned previously, most manufacturing firms received little in the
way of direct subsidies.  The fact that subsidies tended to go into non-tradables should result in
crowding-out-type effects, with negative implications for manufacturing firms.  Such effects will be
common to all firms, however, and should therefore not have implications for comparisons across firms
within industries.
IV.  Data
The analysis that follows is based on a panel of quarterly observations for  1992:I--1995:I for all
manufacturing firms compiled by the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI).  There are 1,337
firms in the sample, all of which are SOEs or cooperatives.  The data set used comprises a balanced
7 A third factor  was an unstable  macro-economic  environment  (Fisher et.al, 1996;  Sachs, 1996). The 1996
World Development  Report estimates  that transition  economies  with annual inflation  above  40% generally  fail to
register industrial  growth. As of 1994  the average  inflation  rate in Bulgaria  was around  50%, having  peaked at
over 300% in 1991. Kotzeva  and Perotti (1996)  find that 20% of managers  list unstable  macroeconomic
environment  among  the main  obstacles  of firm restructuring;  an additional  45% list related  variables  (price
variability  in input  markets,  high interest rates). Since the focus  of this paper is on firm-specific  efforts to
improve  efficiency,  the effect of macroeconomic  policy--a  common  influence--is  ignored.
8panel of firms.  For purposes of analysis a 81 sector breakdown was constructed, using the Bulgarian
classification of state enterprises.  The data set includes information on a large number of variables.
Nominal values were converted to real values (base year 94:IV) using sector-specific producer price
indices reported by the Bulgarian National Bank (Bank Review, various issues).  Individual
observations were checked for recording errors with the help of researchers from the NSI. 8 To account
for additional outliers, all regressions are run twice, where the second run (reported in the tables)
excluded firms with residuals from the first regression that exceed two standard deviations. 9
Exports (reported in domestic currency) are converted in US$ at the average exchange rate for
each quarter and then converted back in domestic currency at the end- 1994 exchange rate.'"  Some of
the accounting conventions used in Bulgaria required adjustments in the data."  During 1992-93
especially, some firms received direct or indirect government subsidies.  Such subsidies are excluded
from sales revenues.  Production is measured by gross output instead of real value added.  Although
value-added estimates are used more frequently in productivity studies, value-added can be interpreted
as a measure of output only if there is perfect competition.  If imperfect competition exists, value-added
suffers from an omitted-variable bias, and is subject to different aggregation biases.  We therefore
estimate production functions for each firm based on gross output and then convert the productivity
8 Several  recording  errors were found  and corrected. A small number  of firms were dropped  from the sample
because  the original forms  submitted  to the NSI revealed  coding  errors.  This  checking  process led to 9% of firms
in the original sample  to be excluded.
9 In principle,  there are techniques  that do not unduly  weight  outliers,  e.g., a median  regression. Upon
inspection,  however,  outliers  in the data set are generated  from value-subtracting  firms, implying  that the
denominators  in equations  (5) and (6) are negative. TFP estimates  for such firms will be a large negative  number,
and thus not readily  interpretable.
'1  This was suggested  by a referee.
" Production  for inventory  was included  in sales revenues  until 1993. The definition  of production  used in our
analysis  conforms  to the convention  as it includes  the increase  in inventory.
9change estimate into value-added TFP change."2 As there is little variation in the value of total fixed
capital assets (machinery and equipment, vehicles, and buildings), the 92:J value of capital is taken as
the base, to which investment reported by firms in each quarter is added and a depreciation charge is
subtracted.  Since depreciation numbers vary considerably across quarterly reports by the same firm,
we use the numbers suggested by Hulten and Wykoff (1981): buildings are depreciated at a rate of
0.0361,  and machinery and equipment at a rate of 0.1179.  Data are also reported on both the average
number of workers employed in each quarter,  as well as the total hours worked.  The ratio of blue-
collar and white-collar labor is not available; the reported wage bill is averaged over all employees,
including managers.
A possible factor confounding any empirical analysis using data reported by Bulgarian firms is
that statistics are likely to be unreliable.  In particular,  given the extensive links between SOEs and the
informal, private sector,  data may be biased insofar as managers of SOEs have incentives to under-
report economic activity and operating profits, and channel such profits to private sector partners via
transfer pricing,  arrears  in accounts receivables, etc.  The greater the prevalence of public-private
sector cooperation, the greater the downward bias that may be expected in output, value and profit data
reported to the NSI.  In general, therefore,  it must be borne  in mind that statistical analyses based on
"official" data will most likely paint too dark a picture."3 While this could be a serious problem if the
analysis were to focus on the levels of variables,  in what follows we investigate changes in total factor
productivity.  As long as there is a consistent downward bias in the levels of the variables reported to
the NSI, estimates of changes in TFP should not be affected.  In any event, our interest is in the
relationship between change in TFP and change in integration into the world economy.  Even if the
12 For a detailed  discussion  of these issues  see Basu  and Fernald  (1995) and Hulten  (1978).
"' For example,  the statistics  indicate  that the cash  operating  surplus  (value  added net of wages  and social
payments)  in 1994  was only 1.5 percent of GDP, down from 6.9 percent in 1992  (Claessens  and Peters, 1996).
10estimates  of the magnitude  of TFP changes  are biased, this is not relevant  for the analysis  as long as the
firms that report shifts in patterns of trade do not differ significantly  in their reporting  bias from firms
that do not experience  such shifts.
V. Estination  Procedure
The estimation  is based on a two-step  procedure. First, we estimate  a standard  neo-classical  production
function
Y,,  =T,,  [L,,sL  ,Mt  s,", K  U'  I  -]y  (1)
Or in log form
In Y,,=  Y 1 [sLi, nL,I  +sm,1InM,, +(l  -s Li  -s  ,M)  InK, ,] +ln  T,  i=I,...,n;  t=1,...,T  (2)
where Yi, is gross output, LO,  is total hour worked,  M,, is materials used, Ki,,  is total capital stock, Tl, is
a measure of technology,  and SL and SM  are the shares of labor and material inputs' expenditures  in total
expenditure  respectively. Two separate specifications  of equation (2) are estimated.  In the benchmark
specification  we substitute  In Ti, = a; + ei,  where ai represents  firm-specific  fixed effects and the
disturbance  term ei, is NID(0, o2). Our preferred specification  also includes  a term for the average
number of hours worked to take into account  the possibility  that a change in employment  is
accompanied  by a change in hours worked." 4 As we want to estimate  changes  in productivity  and not
levels, we first-difference  equation  (2) to obtain
AYj,=a,+Y  [SLAlit  +SMi Am,t+(1  sL-sM)  Ak,,]+  P,, Ahl,+ej,  (3)
14 This is a standard  adjustment  in the empirical  macro literature. See e.g., Basu and Femald (1995).
11where Ay,, = In Y,, - In Y,,- 1 and similarly for /li,,,  Ami,,  zk,,  and  hi,, (where the latter are hours
worked).  From either specification gross output-based total factor productivity (TFP) growth is
estimated as the sum of the residual and the firm-specific intercept'5
At  tG  =  i  4it)
This estimated change in gross output-based TFP is converted to a value-added productivity change
,  t  VA= At,,VA  (5)
m
To provide a check on the robustness of the regression estimates, the value-added Solow residual is
calculated directly from the data without estimating the production function as follows
VA  =  (Ayit  - SM  Am,,)  I  A,  SL  IAk  ISL  SM  (6)
We then relate the change in TFP for each firm to various firm-specific variables.  Consistent with the
rest of literature, we run various regressions of the general form
At,'A  =f(INITIALCONDITIONSj;  AGOVERNANCE,;  ASUBSIDYi; ATRADE, ;T)  (7)
including industry and time (T,) dummies to control for sector-specific and economy-wide comnmon
shocks.  INITIAL CONDITIONS consist of variables that characterize the status quo ante.
GOVERNANCE represents variables relating to ownership and management.  TRADE is a measure of
the shift in trade patterns (see below).  The coefficients from the regression (7) can be interpreted only
as partial correlations.  With the exception of TRADE the independent variables are taken from the
15 The possibility  of heteroskedasticity  and autocorrelation  is recognized. In the regressions  reported  below
adjustments  were made for the former and tests were performed  for the latter.
12literature and are used as controls  in the particular  partial correlations  that we wish to explore--those
between  TFP changes  and shifts in trade patterns.
VI.  Results
The estimates of changes in TFP are presented in Table 1.  The average share of labor, materials, and
capital expenditure is 0.291,  0.567, and 0.142 respectively.  We restrict the sum of the three to be
equal to 1 since information on the cost of capital is not available.  These shares are very similar to the
respective shares of US manufacturing firms (Jorgenson, Gollop, Fraumeni,  1987):  0.30,  0.55 and
0.15.  This suggests that the data are possibly not as biased as might be expected given the discussion
in Section IV.  Overall, there is no significant productivity growth in Bulgarian manufacturing during
the 1992-95 period.  This is consistent with other recent studies (Pohl, Djankov, Anderson,  1996;
Avramov and Guenov, 1995, Peters and Claessens, 1996).  This is generally explained by the absence
of a comprehensive privatization program,  the unstable macroeconomic environment, and the continued
presence of soft budget constraints for certain industries.  The estimates show some seasonal variation.
Note that first quarter productivity growth is always negative, while second quarter productivity growth
is usually positive.  This is consistent with the pattern of TFP changes found in the US manufacturing
industries (Miron and Barsky,  1989) and can be explained by the surge in demand during the pre-
Christmas season. 16
Three measures of TFP are reported.  The TFP-I case includes an adjustment for hours
worked, while TFP-II does not.  There is therefore an upward bias in TFP-II due to not accounting for
the possible change in average hours worked by employees.  TFP-III is the Solow residual-based
estimate.  As all three TFP estimates are highly correlated (not reported), what follows is based on
16 Some  38 percent of total  industrial  output in Bulgaria  is produced  in the fourth quarter.
13regressions with TFP-I as the dependent variable.  Four regressions are reported  in Table 2.  The first
one includes only dummy variables for sector,  location, and time.  We include these environmental
variables to control for the impact of general macroeconomic and common industry-specific shocks.
The adjusted R2 is very small (0.021) which suggests that inter-sectoral variations in productivity
changes are not high." 7 The reason for this is that only ten of the eighty sector dummies are statistically
significant (at the 5% level): those for computer components, primary textile processing, wool textiles,
linen products, and vegetable oils are positive; those for petrol processing,  fish, meat, bread and pasta,
and rubber products are negative (not reported).  Eight location-of-production dummnies  are included to
test for the possible effect of production in the capital city (Sofia), the second largest city (Plovdiv), and
proximity to the major sea port (Varna, Bugras), and the other regions (Lovech, Montana,  Russe,
Haskovo).  These regional factors are not significant and do not become so in later regressions--a result
also found by Estrin and Takla (1995) for the Czech and Slovak Republics.  This is hardly surprising
given the legacy of arbitrary  location decisions on new economic establishments under central planning.
The majority of time dummies are statistically significant and roughly follow the pattern of TFP
changes.
Regressions 2 and 3 introduce firm-specific variables.  The choice of explanatory variables is
largely driven by what has been used in the literature (e.g.,  Estrin and Takla,  1995).  The variables are
mostly proxies for initial conditions and internal governance of the firm.  The size variable (log of
output) should capture scale effects that occur if large and small firms differ in the extent to which they
have market power in product or factor markets.  The subsidy variable (log of direct subsidies as a
share of total revenues) and access to credit (log of new bank loans as a share of financial revenues)
17 The explanatory  power of the various "general"  dumrnmies  is much less  than what is found  for
Czechoslovakia  in the same  type of regression  by Estrin and Takla (1995).  Using dummies  for 18  industries,  10
regions, and one time dummy  (1992), they obtain  an R 2 of 0.101 in explaining  labor  productivity  in
Czechoslovakia  for 1992-93. Our result is similar  to the R 2 of 0.03 found  by Claessens  and Peters (1996)  for
Bulgaria  using the same independent  variables,  but focusing  on changes  in value  added instead of TFP.
14measure the hardness of the budget constraint.  Previous studies have found that labor-intensive firms
find it easier to restructure because they are less dependent on outside financing for capital equipment.
The share of labor expenditures in firm total expenditures is included as a proxy for labor intensity.'8
The inclusion of firm-specific factors improves the fit of the regressions dramatically (R 2 of
0.113).  Initial conditions are highly significant.  The coefficients largely confirm the findings of Pinto
and van Wijnbergen (1994) for Poland and Estrin and Takla (1995) for the Czech and Slovak
Republics: large, labor-intensive firms with access to financing perform better than others.  The size
and credit variables are statistically significant, but the magnitude of the credit coefficient in particular
is quite small.  Note that the subsidy and labor intensity variables are insignificant.  The former result
is not unexpected, given that most subsidies in the 1992-95 period were targeted on non-tradable
industries (not considered here).  The labor intensity variable has the expected sign, but becomes
statistically insignificant once dummies are included for past restructuring efforts (see below).
Noteworthy is the negative sign of the lagged profitability coefficient and the positive sign of
the value-subtractor coefficient.  The dummy for Value Subtractor is 1 if a firm could not pay for the
cost of its material inputs in the previous quarter,  and 0 otherwise; the dummy for Profitable Firms is 1
if a firm reported positive after tax profit in the previous quarter,  and 0 otherwise. These variables are
used as instruments for past productivity change'9 and can be regarded as proxies for changes in
internal governance of the firm.  That is, the "better" and more active are management efforts to
restructure,  the better TFP performance  should be in the future.  The coefficients suggest that
successful restructuring is followed by a period of passivity,  and vice versa (regression 3).  Thus, the
18 Pre-reform investment  dummies  were included  following  the Estrin-Takla  (1995)  hypothesis  that firms that
received  new machinery  and equipment  in the immediate  pre-reform  period (1988-91  in the case of Bulgaria)
should  do better than firms which  did not receive any new machinery  and equipment  in the 10 years prior to
reform. However, these  variables  were insignificant  and are not reported.
'9 Since the inclusion  of lagged  values of the dependent  variable  (changes  in TFP) will render the regression
estimates  inconsistent,  we instrument  for it by using  the two profitability-related  dummies.
15worst-performing firms in the previous quarter improved the most, while firms which reported net
profits registered a decline in productivity growth.  This suggests that managers of relatively well-
performing (profitable) firms take it easy, but those in charge of enterprises with serious financial
problems are induced to undertake greater efforts to improve productivity.  These findings may reflect
the distorted incentive structure facing managers discussed previously.
Regression 4 turns to relationship between TFP growth and trade integration.  Noteworthy in
all of the regressions is the insignificance of the coefficient on the export share of sales.  This is also
found in other studies, and is sometimes interpreted to imply that there is no significant correlation
between restructuring of firms and the extent of integration into world markets (e.g., Claessens and
Peters,  1996).  However, as noted earlier,  there is no a priori reason to believe that changes in
productivity should be related to the level of past exports. A better measure of the impact of trade  is the
change in the geographic pattern of imports and exports, as this fits much closer with the theoretical
prediction that the improved access to the much richer global stock of technologies and know-how
should allow (induce) managers to exploit this source of productivity improvement.
In regression 4 dummies are included for import and export redirection.  The overall fit of the
regression improves slightly, to 0.127.  More important are the magnitude of the coefficient estimates.
The import dummy differentiates between firms which have redirected a large share of their supply
orders (over 30%) from domestic or former CMEA to OECD markets (Dummy  =  1) and kept this
extent of sourcing at this level or higher in the four quarters prior to our observation of productivity
change.  The dummy is set at zero for firms that continue to use local or former CMEA suppliers. 20
The estimated coefficient for this variable is positive in sign, relatively large as compared to other
explanatory variables and highly significant statistically.  This suggests that the use of imported
20  Using this definition,  44 firms "redirect"  their sourcing  to OECD  markets  in 1990, 106  firms in 1991,  85
firms in 1992,  41 firms in 1993, and 64 firms in 1994.
16intermediate inputs enhances productivity growth.  The dummy for export redirection is also highly
significant, and is double the size of the import redirection dummy.  The export reorientation dummy
differentiates between firms which have redirected more than 30 percent of their production from the
domestic or former CMEA to OECD markets and sustained this over the four quarters prior to our
measurement of TFP change (Dummy =  1), and those that have not (Dummy  =  0).21  Eighty-four
firms became exporters to OECD markets in 1991, 108 in 1992, 168 in 1993, and 47 in 1994.
The use of discrete measures of trade integration assumes that redirection increases productivity
regardless of the volume of exports or imports (provided it is consistently maintained).  This simplifies
the analysis because it avoids the problem of endogeneity of trade levels in the regressions.  In
principle,  since our basic hypothesis is that there will be an upward shift in the productivity of new
entrants into export/import markets,  simple plots would allow a comparison of relative performance.
However, due to the short time-series available, this was not possible.
VII.  Conclusions
The impact of international trade can be analyzed at different levels.  Most analyses focus on the effect
of trade on the economy as a whole, or at the level of the industry.  This is especially the case
regarding the impact of import competition as a source of market discipline (see e.g.,  Levinsohn, 1993;
Harrison,  1994).  The analysis here was explicitly restricted to the level of the firm.  Factors such as
macro-economic forces which affect all firms and common industry-specific variables--which embody
important forces such as the level and change in import competition on final product markets--are
controlled for.
The results indicate that trade is an important source of TFP growth at the level of the firm.  As
21  See Hoekman  and Djankov  (1996) for an analysis  of changes  in the pattern  of trade of Central and Eastern
European  countries  during 1989-95.
17is suggested  by the endogenous  growth literature, trade matters. We find that shifts in the pattern of
imports  of intermediates--and  reorientation  of export production--towards  global markets are positively
correlated  with TFP growth. The coefficients  are of the expected  sign, relatively  large in magnitude,
and statistically  highly  significant. In contrast, the level of exports as a share of output was found not
be correlated with TFP growth. Although  no attempt  has been made to establish  causality,  the partial
correlations  that are found are highly suggestive. They support  the theory in the sense that firms that
reorient their trade patterns--which  has been argued  to be the most appropriate  measure of trade
integration  for economies  in transition--tend  to have higher growth rates of total factor productivity.
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21Table 1: Changes  in Total Factor Productivity
(Value  Added, Equation  5 in text)
Quarter  TFP-I  TFP-II*  TFP-III.
11:92  0.104 (0.013)  0.124 (0.013)  0.140 (0.014)
111:92  -0.014 (0.012)  -0.035 (0.015)  -0.047 (0.017)
IV:92  0.075 (0.014)  0.107 (0.016)  0.118 (0.017)
1:93  -0.091 (0.014)  -0.099 (0.016)  0.002 (0.022)
11:93  0.015 (0.011)  0.036 (0.013)  0.057 (0.013)
111:93  0.049 (0.014)  0.064 (0.015)  0.086 (0.017)
IV:93  -0.037 (0.013)  -0.038 (0.014)  -0.070 (0.016)
1:94  -0.014 (0.015)  -0.011 (0.016)  0.053 (0.020)
11:94  0.039 (0.013)  0.019 (0.014)  0.068 (0.012)
111:94  -0.055 (0.018)  -0.054 (0.018)  -0.069 (0.019)
IV:94  0.035 (0.013)  0.033 (0.014)  0.060  (0.014)
1:95  -0.147 (0.017)  -0.156 (0.018)  -0.131 (0.021)
Median  0.000  0.011  0.055
Mean  -0.003  0.003  0.022
Standard Error  0.021  0.024  0.024
Implied Growth  -0.058  -0.008  0.258
R
2 0.906  0.875  l
Observations  1237  1237  1237
Note:  Heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors in parentheses.
Regression  estimate  including  an adjustment  for average  hours worked.
Regression  estimate  without  adjustment  for hours worked.
Solow  residual  calculation  using equation  6 in the text.
Source: Authors'  estimates.
22Table 2: Determinants of Change in TFP
Independent Variable*  [  Change in TFP
l  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [  I  ________  _______  [  I_I_II  |III  IV
Intercept  -0.069 (-1.771)  -0.556 (-9.345)  -0.508 (-9.303)  -0.508 (-9.354)
Size  0.045 (11.339)  0.053 (13.985)  0.052 (13.576)
Subsidies  0.006 (1.008)  0.006 (0.924)  0.006 (0.924)
Credit  0.011 (3.294)  0.013 (4.273)  0.013 (4.294)
Labor Intensity  0.297 (6.382)  0.047 (1.056)  0.056 (1.231)
Export Share in Sales  0.001 (0.312)  0.001 (0.256)  0.001 (0.256)
Dummy for Export Redirection  0.262 (11.459)
Dummy for Import Redirection  0.107 (6.161)
Dunmmy  for Value Subtractors  0.224 (15.780)  0.219 (15.570)
Dummy for Profitable Firms  -0.156 (-12.978)  -0.152 (-12.746)
Dummy for IV:92  0.088  (4.315)  0.061  (3.026)  0.009  (0.498)  0.011  (0.594)
Dummy for  1:93  -0.073 (-3.589)  -0.075 (-3.627)  -0.106 (-5.474)  -0.102 (-5.290)
Dummy for 11:93  0.029  (1.459)  -0.006 (0.301)  0.004  (0.244)  0.007  (0.344)
Dummy for III:93  0.066  (3.167)  0.048  (2.415)  0.052  (2.735)  0.055  (2.897)
Dummy for IV:93  -0.026 (-1.259)  -0.038 (-1.917)  -0.030 (-1.555)  -0.097 (-1.394)
Dummy for  1:94  0.003  (0.147)  -0.021 (-1.072)  -0.040 (-2.089)  -0.038 (-1.959)
Dummy for 11:94  0.056  (2.738)  0.042  (2.094)  0.060  (3.132)  0.065  (3.394)
Dummy for III:94  -0.036 (-1.771)  -0.041 (-2.044)  -0.008 (-0.416)  -0.003 (-0.163)
Dummy for IV:94  0.048  (2.346)  0.028  (1.408)  0.030  (1.588)  0.037  (1.944)
Dummy for L:95  -0.135 (-6.599)  -0.134 (-6.671)  -0.092 (-4.745)  -0.082 (-4.270)
Adjusted R  |  0.021  1  0.036  [  0.113  1  0.127
Durbin Watson Statistics  [  2.289  |  2.263  |  2.193  |  2.201
Weighted Least Squares are used to correct for heteroskedasticity.  All regressions include a vector of 80 sector dummies and a
vector of 8 region dummies.  The number of observations in each regression is 13,607.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  The presence
of autocorrelation is rejected in all regressions at the 5 % significance level.
Source:  Authors'  estimates.
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